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IN THE SUPRElVIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR P. DANSAK and 
ROBERTS. LYON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
LOUIS C. DELUKE, 
Defendcml and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9355 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs instituted this suit to recover the principal sum 
and interest due on several promissory notes. Defendant con-
ceded nonpayment of the notes by him but contended that 
they had been discharged by a purported agreement entered 
into between the plaintiffs and a third person. The case was 
tried by the court sitting without a jury on May 11 and June 
13 and 14, 1960. Judgment was entered in favor of the 
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plaintiffs and the court denied defendant's motion for a new 
trial. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As a preface to his Statement of Facts, defendant at 
page 1 of his brief advises the Court that the controlling 
question in this case is "what consideration did plaintiffs, 
Dansak and Lyon, give for Lucy Deluke Jones' promise ... to 
assign the [ Carisa] Lease . . . ?" This was not the question 
before the trial court and this is not the issue before this 
Court on appeal. The issue is whether or not the plaintiffs 
entered into a contract, for the cancellation of their notes, 
and, if so, whether the contract was consummated and amounted 
to a discharge of the notes. Defendant had the burden of 
proving the contract and a discharge of the notes. The 
trial court found from the evidence that plaintiffs did not 
agree to cancel their notes and that any agreement made with 
respect to the corporation was not consummated but was frus-
trated. There is ample evidence to support these ·findings. 
The plaintiffs each loaned money to the defendant and 
took promissory notes evidencing the indebtedness. The notes 
have never been paid. Defendant's defense is based upon an 
alleged agreement which he claims arose out of the formation 
of a corporation in Phoenix, Arizona. 
The loan transactions on which the notes are based 
are entirely unrelated to the corporate affair in Phoenix. 
The defendant was not a party to the latter transaction. It 
is undisputed that the plaintiffs themselves received nothing 
in cash, stock or property of any kind from the Phoenix 
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deal. Defendant's theory, however, appears to be that the 
plaintiffs orally agreed with one Lucy Deluke Jones (herein 
called Lucy) to cancel their notes in exchange for the assign-
ment of a lease. The testimony of plaintiffs on the subject is 
clear. Dansak testified: 
(R. 211) 
"Q. Have you ever discussed the matter of distribution 
or cancellation of your notes with Lucy Jones or 
Ed Jones? 
A. No. 
Q. At any time? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever authorized anyone to act on your 
behalf in negotiatmg the cancellation or dis-. 
charge of these notes? 
A. No." 
(R. 213, 214) 
"Q. Did you ever at any time have a discussion with 
Ed Jones regarding the cancellation of these notes? 
A. I have never discussed dissolving these notes at any 
time with any person.'' 
Lyon testified: 
(R. 120) 
"Q. Have you ever had any conversation with either 
Lucy Jones or Ed Jones regarding the cancellation 
of these notes ? 
A. No. 
Q. Has any conversation ever been had in your pres-
ence with Lucy Jones, Ed Jones, or either of them, 
regarding cancellation of these notes? 
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A. No. 
Q. Have you ever authorized anyone on your behalf, 
any of these incorporators, to speak for you in 
regard to disposition of these notes. 
A. No." 
Under questioning by the court Lyon testified as follows: 
(R. 220) 
"Q. Counsel asked you whether or not you ever 
authorized anyone to speak for you in canceling 
the obligations of Mr. Deluke on these notes. 
Were you aware anyone was presuming to speak 
for you, with or without authority, or appeared 
to be speaking for you and against others in 
reference to the claim against Louis C. Deluke? 
A. I was not, and this was not the intent of the organ-
izers of the Sphinx Head Mining Company." 
There was no direct evidence whatever that the plaintiffs 
had agreed with Lucy Deluke to cancel their notes. 
The main issue reserved for trial by the pretrial order 
was "what was the agreement between Lucy Deluke, [and] 
the plaintiffs ... (R. 12) ." Although the defendant in refer-
ring to the plaintiffs in his brief uses such words as "memory 
lapses," "larcenous," "fleecing," "greed," ··untrustworthy" and 
"selfish plan," the defendant does not tell us when, where and 
between whom the alleged contract was made nor what the 
terms of the contract were nor when, if at all, the alleged 
contract was consummated. 
Defendant in his brief says that" objectively a contract 
was made at least by the March 6 meeting and completely 
complied with by Lucy and ratified by the subsequent actions 
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of the incorporators" (page 16), and later in his brief says 
"it is the defendant's position that the March 6, 1957, meeting 
resulted in an accord and satisfaction wherein the Phoenix 
group traded their claims against the defendant in return for 
a promised share in the corporation.'' Still later in his brief 
defendant says "Lucy promised to convey the Carisa Lease in 
trust for a future corporation in return for a promise on the 
part of the Phoenix group to discharge and release the obliga-
tions which they claimed against Lucy's uncle, Louis C. De-
luke." These three quotes taken from defendant's brief 
demonstrate the confusion of the defendant himself in the 
assertion that the notes were discharged. 
Although the date of the contract is not fixed, defendant 
has stated under oath that the agreement upon which he 
relies is an oral contract entered into in Phoenix, Arizona, 
in l\1arch, 1957 (Answer to Interrogatory No. 6, R. 18). The 
plaintiffs did not meet at any time with Lucy Deluke during 
the months of January or February, 1957 (R. 119, 120, 211). 
Yet, on February 16 (prior to the purported contract) Lucy 
assigned the Carisa Lease to herself and Dr. Rogers as trustees 
(R. 182). This instrument was one of defendant's exhibits 
and it recites that a corporation would be formed and that 
stock would be issued 
"in such amounts as shaH hereafter be determined 
by the first constituted Board of Directors of the pro· 
posed corporation, which shall include the undersigned 
(Lucy] and Dr. William J. Rogers of Phoenix, Ari-
zona, and such others as they shall jointly agree on . 
. . . " (Ex. D-5). 
In view of the fact that defendant does not claim any contract 
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until March, 195 7, and in view of the fact that there was no 
discussion regarding stock division until March, it is apparent 
that the assignment in trust could not have been made in 
reliance on any contract or agreement as to stock division. As 
to stock division this was to be decided "by the first constituted 
Board of Directors of the corporation (Ex. D-5) . " 
On March 5 the incorporators met, selected officers and 
directors and decided upon a name for the proposed corpora-
tion. The following day, on March 6, the incorporators discussed 
a division of the capital stock of the corporation and decided 
upon the proposed capital structure and a division of the 
capital stock. 
The articles of incorporation were signed on March 21 
and filed on March 28. On April 16, the first constituted 
Board of Directors met in the first official meeting of the new 
corporation. At this meeting the trustees, Lucy Deluke and Dr. 
Rogers executed an assignment of the Carisa Lease to the 
corporation. Suggestions were made by counsel of the corpora-
tion with respect to the watering effect which their original 
proposed division of stock would result in. Since the business of 
the meeting of the 16th was not concluded, it was continued 
the following day on April 17. On the 17th the Board of 
Directors resumed the discussion on division of the capital 
stock and it was suggested that each incorporator receive a 
proportionately smaller amount than arrived at in the March 6 
meeting. The first meeting of the Board of Directors of the 
corporation blew up at this point when Lucy Deluke and her 
husband, Ed Jones, got up and walked out of the meeting. 
There were several attempts made to resolve the rift 
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which had occurred as a result of the April 17 discussions about 
stock division. Lucy and her hucband, Ed, and the other in-
corporators never did agree between themselves as to the shares 
to be issued to each of the incorportaors. The dispute was 
never settled and no capital stock of the corporation was ever 
issued to any stockholder. The corporation conducted no actual 
corporate business and was formally dissolved the following 
spnng. 
Lucy was advised that it would be impossible to go ahead 
with the corporate transaction unless she could agree with 
the other incorporators as to the amount of capital stock to be 
issued (Ex. P-13). There was no agreement made. When Lucy 
left the April 17 meeting, she considered the deal as having 
been frustrated, and she again considered herself as owner of 
the Carisa Lease (R. 203). Since that time she has paid the 
lease payments, done the assessment work and considered her-
self in all respects as the owner of the said lease. The corpora-
tion has takn the same position. It did not even show the lease 
on its balance sheet at the time of dissolution. Lucy claims to 
be the owner of the lease and apparently no one disputes this 
fact. But she also contends that as a result of the transactions 
just described she accomplished the cancellation of $80,000 in 
indebtedness on the part of Louis Deluke, including the 
plaintiffs' claims against Deluke. 
Lucy claims that she intended to obtain a cancellation 
of Louis Deluke' s notes. If this was her intention, there is no 
evidence that she ever made this fact known to the plaintiffs, 
Dansak and Lyon. The matter of the cancellation or discharge 
of their notes was never discussed with them and their testi-
mony that they did not intend to release Deluke is unimpeached. 
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In order to draw the papers necessary to organize a 
corporation, it was necessary to have the services of legal 
counsel. The evidence discloses that Dr. Rogers, one of the 
mcorporators, employed Charles Stanecker to do the legal work 
necessary in forming a corporation. He prepared the papers and 
advised as to the legal requirements of organizing an Arizona 
corporation. If he represented any of the incorporators as 
distinguished from the corporation, he represented all of them, 
including Lucy and her husband, Ed. Stanecker was not author-
ized directly or by implication to negotiate for the discharge of 
the plaintiffs' claims against Deluke or to in any way deal with 
said claims. Stanecker never represented the plaintiffs as 
individuals (R. 128) and was never employed by them to deal 
with their personal claims against Deluke. 
Instead of bringing Stanecker before the court, the de-
fendant sought to offer testimony as to purported statements 
made by him in February, 1957, which defendant claims would 
have a bearing on the purported contract between Lucy and 
the plaintiffs This testimony was properly excluded. 
Lucy Deluke brought her own counsel to Arizona, and 
he advised her concerning the transaction. Stanecker never 
made any request for the notes. Lucy Deluke' s counsel never 
made any request for the notes and Lucy herself never requested 
delivery of the notes from the plaintiffs. Although she now 
claims that the notes were discharged, she did not make such 
claim until this suit was instituted. Notwithstanding the fact 
that there were at least two attorneys involved in the transaction 
and that minutes were taken of all of the meetings, there is 
not a single written document nor is there any reference in 
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the minutes of the meetings evidencing any intended cancel-
lation of the Louis Deluke obligations. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD FAILED TO PROVE A 
DISCHARGE OF THE NOTES. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING 
KENNON'S T E S T I M 0 NY AS TO EXTRAJUDICIAL 
STATEMENTS OF STANECKER. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DIREC-
TORS FAILED TO AGREE UPON A DIVISION OF STOCK 
AND THAT THE CORPORATE VENTURE WAS FRUS-
TRATED IS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER EVIDENCE. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD FAILED TO PROVE A 
DISCHARGE OF THE NOTES. 
The defendant contends in effect that the court was 
required to find as a matter of law that the plaintiffs agreed 
with Lucy Deluke to cancel their notes and that the effect of 
the agreement was to discharge the defendant's obligation 
thereon. 
As already pointed out, defendant has not furnished the 
Court with any evidence nor is there any clear statement in 
defendant's brief which indicates what the actual substance of 
the alleged contract was. The plaintiffs categorically deny 
that they discussed the cancellation of their notes with anyone 
at any time and specifically state that they made no agreement 
whatever with Lucy Deluke, by the terms of which they were to 
cancel or surrender their notes. Although there were numerous 
written documents, including written minutes of all of the 
meetings of the incorporators, there was nothing whatever in 
any of the written instruments to indicate that the plaintiffs had 
agreed to cancel their notes. Lucy Deluke claims that she 
brought her attorney from Texas to Phoenix to see that the 
transaction was cinched down and yet there is nothing whatever 
in writing to corroborate her claim that the notes were to be 
cancelled. Lucy herself did not offer one sentence of testimony 
to the effect that either Dansak or Lyon agreed with her to 
discharge the notes. Further, Lucy admits that she never did 
ask for surrender of the notes. She didn't ask for the notes 
10 
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after the assignment in trust; she didn't request delivery of 
the notes after the assignment to the corporation, and she 
didn't make any claim that the notes were discharged until 
this suit was instituted. 
In the face of these facts Deluke now contends that the 
evidence before the trial court required a finding as a matte1' 
of law that the plaintiffs had agreed to cancel their notes and 
that the agreement was consummated. We submit that this 
contention demonstrates the desperate straits of the defendant 
in finding some ground for reversal of the trial court's judgment. 
Defendant suggests in his brief that "objectively a contract 
was made, at least by the March 6 meeting (Pg. 16) ." 
Plaintiffs' testimony is that they had not ever met with Lucy 
or her representatives until March 5. There was no discussion 
in the meeting of the 5th or the 6th (or at any other time) 
pertaining to the notes. What acts of the plaintiffs does the 
defendant claim required the court to find as a matter of law 
that "objectively" a contract was formed? There is not enough 
substance in this argument to merit answer. 
As another point in his brief defendant says "the March 
6 meeting resulted in an accord and satisfaction (Pg. 16) ." 
\Vhat was there about this meeting that resulted in the loss of 
the plaintiffs' claims against Deluke? The assignment in trust 
had been made several days before on February 16. At that 
time the assignment which Lucy had signed indicated that the 
division of stock was to be decided upon by the Board of 
Directors of a corporation that had not even been organized on 
March 6. Lucy at the March 6 meeting made no promise and 
relinquished nothing. There was no promise or agreement 
11 
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made on the part of the plaintiffs. Nothing was said about the 
notes. The "accord and satisfaction" arising out of the meeting 
of March 6 is a mere figment of the imagination of defendant's 
counsel. 
Finally, defendant contends that "objectively a contract 
was formed whereby Lucy promised to convey the Carisa Lease 
in trust for a future corporation ... (Pg. 17)" and that it 
is "wholly immaterial" what the plaintiffs "subjectively felt 
or intended". We are at a loss to know what counsel means 
by an "objective" contract. What evidence is relied upon to 
show that Dansak and Lyon relinquished their rights against 
Louis Deluke? It would appear that counsel now contends 
there was an "objective contract" prior to the assignment in 
trust on February 16. This is inconsistent with his claim 
prior to trial that "the agreement was an oral one and was 
entered into in Phoenix, Arizona, in March, 195 7 (Answer 
to Interrogatory No. 6, R. 18). Neither of the plaintiffs had 
anything to do with Lucy Deluke prior to March 5 (R. 119, 
120, 211). There was simply no contract, subjective or 
objective. 
We are not told by defendant why the Court was required 
as a matter of law to disregard the only direct testimony 
on the issue which was given by the plaintiffs when they 
categorically denied any agreement or authorization for such 
agreement. A fair and impartial reading of the transcript of 
the evidence will disclose not only that the judgment of the 
court is supported by ample evidence but that as a matter of 
law no other conclusion could have been reached for there was 
simply no evidence whatever of the character necessary to 
prove a contract. 
12 
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The undisputed evidence discloses that Lucy agreed to 
a stock division by the Board of Directors. She refused to 
be bound by their ultimate decision, however, and walked out 
on the transaction, brushing aside efforts to settle the dispute. 
She knew the corporate transactions could not go without her 
consent; she had her lease, and now says that she also figures 
that $80,000.00 in obligations were cancelled by her actions, 
at no expense to herself. This is the practical side of the 
defendant's argument. 
But even had there been evidence compelling a conclusion 
that plaintiffs agreed to cancel their notes, the judgment 
was nevertheless correct. The entire corporate transaction 
was frustrated when Lucy repudiated the proposed division 
of stock on April 17. The plaintiffs received no stock or 
other benefits which they might have otherwise obtained out 
of the transaction. The corporation, as such, never conducted 
business, was not qualified in Utah, and was dissolved before 
having any stockholders. The entire object of the undertaking 
was frustrated as a consequence of Lucy's refusal to abide 
by the decision of the Board of Directors. Counsel in his brief 
suggests that the corporation could have proceeded without 
Lucy's consent. This argument ignores the fact that Lucy 
was unwilling to accept anything less than a half million 
shares and that all that could have resulted from the April 17 
meeting had the remaining directors insisted upon going 
ahead was a lawsuit over the corporation and the Carisa 
Lease. Even had defendant proved a contract, the very purpose 
and object of the same was frustrated, and defendant there-
fore cannot rely upon the same as a defense. Restatement 
of Contracts, Volume 1, § 288; 12 Am. Jur. 960. 
13 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING 
KENNON'S TESTIMONY AS TO EXTRA JUDICIAL 
STATEMENTS OF STANECKER. 
Defendant called one Troy Kennon to testify as to an 
alleged conference had out of the presence of the plaintiffs 
in February, 1957. This testimony was offered to show certain 
alleged statements of Charles Stanecker, an attorney, who 
was employed to prepare the corporate papers. Kennon's 
testimony was offered by the following questions and answers: 
(R. 133) 
"Q. Dd you talk to Mr. Stanecker with respect to the 
request Mr. Deluke had made? 
A. Yes, but prior to the time I discussed this matter 
with Mr. Stanecker, I asked him whether or not 
he had the authority to represent all the parties 
who held notes and other obligations of Louis 
Deluke. 
Q. What did Mr. Stanecker say? 
A. He advised me . . . 
MR. MACFARLANE: I am going to object to 
what Mr. Stanecker said. If they are attempting 
to prove agency, they can't do it by the claimed 
agent. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained." 
The plaintiff objected to the testimony of Kennon on the 
grounds that it was hearsay (R. 134). 
Defendant's counsel stated that he offered Kennon's 
testimony to show that "Mr. Stanecker had a concept of what 
14 
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the ideas of these incorporators were (R. 134) ." When the 
evidence was refused, defendant's counsel made a proffer of 
Kennon's testimony stating that Kennon would testify that 
he had "satisfied himself" that the men in the corporation 
"were transferring all of the legal obligations of Mr. Louis 
Deluke for Lucy Deluke signing her property to the corpo-
ration" (R. 137}. 
What Stanecker' s concept of the incorporators' ideas were 
is not material or relevant. At most it would be a conclusion 
on his part. Likewise, Kennon's conclusion was not material to 
any issue before the court. 
The law is well settled that Stanecker' s statement as to 
whether or not he was authorized by the plaintiffs as their 
agent was hearsay and inadmissible. Agency cannot be proved 
by declarations of the claimed agent. Restatement of Agency, 
§ 285; 3 C.J.S. 276; State vs. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 390-391, 
120 P.2d 285, 298, 299. 
There was no evidence whatever that the plaintiffs had 
authorized Stanecker to deal with their claims against Louis 
Deluke. Staneckers' only connection with the plaintiffs was 
that he was employed by one of the other incorporators to 
do legal work in the organization of the corporation. The 
very issue in this lawsuit was whether or not the plaintiffs 
as a part of the corporate transaction agreed to cancel or 
discharge their notes. Plaintiffs offered no independent evidence 
whatever to the effect that Dansak and Lyon had authorized 
Stanecker to speak for them in the settlement of their claims 
against Deluke. The only evidence with respect to Stanecker' s 
authority came from the plaintiffs themselves, who emphatically 
15 
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denied that Stanecker was so authorized and testified that the 
corporate transaction did not involve the proposed cancellation 
or discharge of the Deluke notes (R. 120, 128, 211, 213, 214). 
In determining whether or not to admit the alleged 
extrajudicial statements of Stanecker the court made a deter-
mination as to the sufficiency of the preliminary facts bearing 
upon the claimed agency. The determination that Stanecker 
was not authorized by Dansak and Lyon to speak in the cancel-
lation of their notes was not only supported, but compelled by 
the evidence before the court. But even assuming that the evi-
dence might have been properly received, the applicable rule 
seems to be that where admissibility turns upon a determination 
of preliminary facts, the admission or exclusion of the proffered 
evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. This 
rule is affirmed in the case of Jameson vs. First Savings Bank 
& Trust Company, 40 N.M. 133, 55 P.2d 743, cited by defend-
and, wherein the court said: 
"The great weight of modern authority, moreover, 
inclines toward leaving the question of admissibility 
of this class of evidence to the discretion of the trial 
court." 
The New Mexico Supreme Court in the Jameson case quoted 
with approval from Roach vs. Great Northern R. Co., 133 
Minn. 257, 158 N.W. 232, wherein the court said: 
"It may accurately enough be said that there is no 
specific rule of precise application. In each case the 
application must depend upon the particular facts 
. . . In reviewing the trial court's ruling this court 
defers to its determination of the preliminary facts 
bearing upon the propriety of receiving the testimony. 
To this extent its admissibility is within the sound 
judgment of the trial court." 
16 
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Defendant cites the Restatement of Agency, Section 50, 
m support of his contention that the testimony of Kennon 
was admissible. This section provides: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, authority to make a con-
tract is inferred from authortiy to conduct a transaction, 
if the making of such a contract is incidental to the 
transaction, usually accompanies such a transaction, 
or is reasonably necessary to accomplish it." 
In the case at bar there is no evidence that Stanecker was 
authorized "to conduct a transaction" on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
and certainly it cannot be said that the discharge of the 
Deluke notes was "incidental to the transaction" or "usually 
accompanied such a transaction" or was "reasonably necessary 
to accomplish it." None of these requirements were met 
in the instant case. In determining these preliminary facts 
adversely to the defendant and excluding the testimony, the 
court did not abuse its discretion. 
Lastly, we point out as already noted under Point I, 
that even had a contract been proved, the undisputed evidence 
shows that it does not constitute a defense because the entire 
purpose thereof was frustrated (Finding No. 11). Thus the 
exclusion of Stanecker' s testimony could not be determinative 
in any event. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court did not err 
in excluding Kennon's testimony as to the alleged statements 
of Stanecker. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DIREC-
TORS FAILED TO AGREE UPON A DIVISION OF STOCK 
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AND THAT THE CORPORATE VENTURE WAS FRUS-
TRATED IS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE. 
By its Finding of Fact No. 11 the court found as follows 
(R. 25-26): 
"No. 11. The defendant failed to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors 
of Sphinx Head Mining Corporation agreed upon a 
division of the capital stock of said corporation as to 
Lucy Deluke and the purpose of any purported agree-
ment entered into between the plaintiffs and the said 
Lucy Deluke was thereby frustrated without the fault 
or neglect of the plaintiffs." 
Defendant contends that the inference to be drawn from this 
finding is that in its absence the court "would have been 
compelled to find for the defendant, or at least it would 
not have felt precluded from finding for the defendant." This 
is not so. 
The court found by its finding No. 10 that the defendant 
had failed to prove an agreement for cancellation of the 
notes. Under finding No. 10 the court was compelled to enter 
judgment for the plaintiffs. The facts found in finding No. 11 
were not necessary to the decision unless plaintiffs had actually 
proved a contract. Since there was ample evidence to support 
finding No. 10, this point of defendant's brief is moot. 
However, considering on the merits plaintiff's contention 
with respect to finding No. 11, we submit that the finding 
was supported by ample evidence. Lucy and Ed Jones parted 
with the other directors when the disagreement arose in the 
April 17 meeting with respect to stock division. When Lucy 
left the meeting in April, she and her husband Ed, and the 
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five other incorporators were diametrically opposed as to the 
division of the capital stock of the corporation. 
Lucy, along with the other incorporators, was told in 
the April 17 meeting that the disagreement would "stop any 
further action of the corporation (R. 218) ." After the meeting 
Lucy was advised as follows by letter dated April 25: 
(Ex. P-13) 
"Until this problem with respect to the issuance of 
the stock has been determined it is impossible to go 
forward." 
Defendant's counsel now suggest that the corporation 
could have legally gone ahead without her consent even though 
she was to furnish the only asset of the corporation and was to 
be the majority stockholder. Any such action on the part of the 
other directors would simply have resulted in a lawsuit over the 
lease and the corporate stock. But it is not material what might 
have been done, for the fact is that there was a disagreement 
between the directors as to the stock to be issued and this 
dispute was the actual cause of the failure of the corporation 
to get under way. 
As a result of the dispute, none of the capital stock 
of the corporation was ever issued, and the Carisa lease was 
never operated or developed by the corporation. Although one 
of the officers wrote an unofficial letter, the corporation, itself, 
conducted no business, served no useful purpose, and was dis-
solved in the spring of 1958. Defendant points out in his 
brief that the mutual objective of the incorporators was to 
promote and develop the Carisa properties. This object was 
completely frustrated. The plaintiffs never acquired any 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
interest in the corporation or in the Carise lease, nor did they 
receive any cash or property of any kind as a result of the 
transaction. 
There was ample evidence to support the court's finding 
No. 11. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER EVIDENCE. 
By Point IV of his brief defendant singles out five or 
six rulings of the court which he claims to be erroneous. 
The question calling for the witness to answer as to 
what the agreement was when the trust assignment was executed 
R. 97) clearly called for a conclusion. Also, defendant's own 
evidence shows that the trust assignment was executed in 
February and there was no discussion about stock division 
until March, so there could not have been an agreement when 
the assignment was executed. 
The court properly excluded the testimony relating to 
Lucy's alleged agreement with Dr. Rogers (R. 145). Such 
testimony certainly had no materiality with respect to the 
alleged agreement between Lucy and the plaintiffs. This is 
especially so where the negotiations with Rogers were out of 
the presence of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs had no knowl-
edge of them. 
Also, the court properly ruled out a self-serving and 
hearsay letter written by Lucy (R. 152). An examination 
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of this proposed exhibit shows that it contains nothing that 
would be material even if the letter were otherwise admissible. 
When defendants' counsel asked defendant a leading 
question as to whether or not Stanecker said he was speaking 
for the other incorporators, the court proper! y sustained 
counsel's objection to the same (R. 156). The question clearly 
called for a conclusion. By the very next question and answer 
defendant's counsel asked and received the information sought 
by the improper question. 
Finally, the court was not in error in excluding hearsay 
and conclusion statements by Ed Jones (R. 234, 235). In 
all instances where the plaintiffs were present the court 
admitted testimony as to what was actually said, but properly 
excluded the witnesses' conclusions as to what was said. 
The evidence which defendant claims should have 
been received is typical of the quality of the evidence 
on which the defendant's entire case was grounded. The 
court did not err in its rulings on the evidence and certainly 
nothing "critical" was excluded. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The defendant suggests that the court erred in denying 
his motion for new trial. In support of this contention, 
defendant argues that one of his own exhibits, Exhibit D-5, 
was not genuine, suggesting that affidavits submitted after 
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the trial raised ''a question as to the accuracy and possibly 
the authenticity" of the said exhibit. 
Defendant actually complains of one of his own exhibits 
which was offered by his own counsel in support of his own 
case. With this in mind, it is difficult to see how the defendant 
could expect the trial court or this court to grant him a new 
trial so that he could try the case again without the exihbit. 
The court indicated during the course of the arguments 
that even if defendant's Exhibit D-5 were not genuine and 
even had defendant produced the exhibit he claimed to be the 
actual instrument, it would not be determinative since it was 
a unilateral instrument (Supplemental Record 20). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the motion for new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
This suit though involving a rather simple issue has 
taken three years to prosecute to judgment. We respectfully 
submit that the record on appeal demonstrates that the trial 
court conducted a fair and impartial trial of the issues raised 
by the lawsuit and that there was no error made in its rulings 
on the evidence. The evidence discloses that the defendant has 
not repaid his obligtaion on the notes. Defendant failed to 
prove that the notes had been otherwise discharged. The 
judgment should stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR. 
for VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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